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Does “Terrorism” make sense? 
A case study 
 
O “Terrorismo” faz sentido? 











This paper approaches political (de)radicalization from the conflict 
transformation lenses1 to analyze the data collected in a case study, which was 
conducted in Lebanon in 2017 and 2018. This study includes seven semi-
structured in-depth interviews with seven ex-combatants and one set of focus 
group discussions with twenty ex-combatants. The analysis of the generated 
data aims to understand the radicalization and de-radicalization processes and 
to identify the driving factors of twenty-three ex-combatants. Besides the 
important role of various common driving factors that scholars, in general, 
reached a consensus about, the conflict transformation perspectives on (de)-
radicalization uncovers two new mechanisms. The first one is the “I did not 
know – I did not trust” and the second one is “Normality of Violence”. These 
two mechanisms were fundamental driving factors in the (de)radicalization 
processes of the participants in this case study. Likewise, the results of this case 
study supported the opinion suggesting a minimal role of ideology in 
(de)radicalization processes and political violence. 
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Este artigo aborda a (des)radicalização política através das lentes de 
transformação de conflitos,2 para analisar os dados concebidos num estudo de 
caso, realizado no Líbano entre 2017 e 2018. Este estudo inclui sete entrevistas 
semiestruturadas em profundidade com sete ex-combatentes e um conjunto de 
entrevistas em grupos focais de vinte ex-combatentes. A análise dos dados 
produzidos tem como objetivo compreender os processos de radicalização e 
desradicalização, identificando os fatores determinantes desses vinte e três ex-
combatentes. Para além do papel importante de vários fatores comuns 
determinantes, sobre os quais os investigadores, no geral, chegaram a um 
consenso, as perspectivas de transformação de conflitos na (des)radicalização 
descobrem dois novos mecanismos. O primeiro é o “eu não sabia – não 
confiava” e o segundo é a “Normalidade da Violência”. Estes dois mecanismos 
foram fatores determinantes fundamentais para compreender os processos de 
(des)radicalização dos participantes neste estudo de caso. Da mesma forma, os 
resultados deste estudo de caso apoiaram esta opinião, sugerindo um papel 
mínimo da ideologia nos processos de (des)radicalização e violência política. 
 
Palavras-chave: Radicalização. Desradicalização. Transformação de 





This paper approaches terrorism through the conflict transformation 
lenses,3 and uses the twelve mechanisms of political radicalization4 and the 
(de)radicalization model of Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, de Wolf, Mann 
and Feddes5 as basis for comparison and confirmation. The case study aims to 
understand how individuals adopt or abandon political violence, and to identify 
the root and motivational factors of these processes. It explores, in total, the 
experiences of twenty-three individuals, through seven personal interviews, and 
                                                          
2 LEDERACH, J. P., Little Book of Conflict Transformation. 
3 LEDERACH, J. P., Little Book of Conflict Transformation. 
4 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Mechanisms of Political Radicalization; 
MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction; MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., 
Friction (Revised and expanded edition). 
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a focus group discussions with twenty participants (four interviewees also 
participated in the focus group). In the past, the correspondents had engaged in 
political violence, extremism, and/or terrorism, but are currently living their 
“civil life” away from physical, political violence; some of them are even now 
engaged in peace building and a part of interreligious initiatives. 
“Does it make sense?” is a controversial question when it comes to 
terrorism. It is crucial to address such a question because political violence is one 
of the most pressing issues of our time. In this paper, we wish to explore political 
violence, including violent extremism and terrorism, which we see as possible 
results of a radicalization process. In addition, we also aim to study de-
radicalization, the reverse process of radicalization, as the objective of our research 
is to advance knowledge in how to prevent and mitigate political violence. 
 
1. Conceptual Framework 
 
Political language is not neutral; it influences the perception of both 
sympathizers and antagonists, and the meaning of any term can change to fit 
the political context. Therefore, “what one calls ‘things’ matter” and “concepts 
follow politics”.6 This also accounts for the definition of terms used by scholars, 
especially when they are based on ordinary language and its value judgments7 
or when they serve as a tool for political systems.8 In the radicalization 
discourse, greater attention is needed on the importance of the effect of political 
language9 because of its impact on the lives of many around the globe, and its 
threat to open societies.10 
As a result, an important challenge for researchers on (de)radicalization 
is, to a certain extent, a definitional one.11 What is terrorism? What is 
extremism? What is radicalization? These questions are unlikely to have 
answers that are generally agreed upon.12 Alex Peter Schmid explained, “The 
correct definition would be the one which is constantly used by all users”.13 In 
                                                          
6 CRENSHAW, M., Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts, p. 7. 
7 CRENSHAW, M., Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts, p. 8. 
8 SAID, E., Orientalism, p. 18-42. 
9 CRENSHAW, M., Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts, p. 7. 
10 “Indirectly, the induction of fear can have further deleterious effects increasing polarization 
along ethnic, religious and national lines, promoting conflict among different segments of 
society” (DOOSJE, B. et al., Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization, p. 79). 
11 POWERS, S. M., Conceptualizing radicalization in a market for loyalties, p. 234. 
12 SHAFRITZ, J. M.; GIBBONS, E. F.; SCOTT, G. E., Almanac of modern terrorism, p. 260. 
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this field, however, there is no agreement on any definition,14 due to their 
political meaning.15 For the purpose of this paper, we are not going to repeat 
the extensive political and academic debate about the definitions, which is at a 
general level, “familiar to the point of tedium”.16 
Nevertheless, most of the radicalization discourse, especially after the 
9/11 and 7/7 attacks, was bound by the needs of governments’ security 
establishments aiming to create immediate solutions for counter-terrorism 
policymakers, and to find a clear profile of the terrorist.17 Consequently, 
terrorism, or more precisely, private or non-state actors’ terrorism, became the 
center of the discussion about (de)radicalization in most of the literature.18 
On the one hand, the academic discourse of terrorism included 
problematic “conceptual, rather than empirical” oversimplifications of the 
complex realities;19 and on the other hand, researchers have depoliticized 
radicalization and terrorism’s driving factors and presented them as isolated 
individual phenomena, neglecting the role of the contexts and the emerging 
conflicts.20 This oversimplification and de-politicization has led, for example, 
to a problematic presentation of Islamic ideology as an essential cause or driver 
of terrorism, for which Crenshaw21 has coined the term “drama of terrorism”. 
Thus, the focus in most of the research has been on them – the Muslims, the 
terrorists, the radicals, the crazy, immoral, evil ones etc., rather than on the 
situations that these people were or are actually living in, or that they perceive 
themselves to be in.22 
In this paper, we aim to balance the focus between “them and us” – and to 
study the dynamics in between, i.e. the conflict, since radicalization works not 
only on radicals and terrorists (i.e. them), but also on those who react to radicals 
and terrorists (i.e. us), because “[t]he friction of conflict heats both sides”.23 
 
 
                                                          
14 GROB-FITZGIBBON, B., What is Terrorism?, p. 234. 
15 CRENSHAW, M., Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts, p. 7. 
16 FREEDMAN, L., The coming war on terrorism, p. 46. 
17 DOOSJE, B. et al., Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization, p. 79; HAFEZ, M.; 
MULLINS, C., The Radicalization Puzzle, p. 960; KUNDNANI, A., Radicalisation, p. 6. 
18 FITZ-GIBBON, A., Talking to Terrorists, Non-Violence, and Counter-Terrorism, p. 15-29. 
19 BORUM, R., Radicalization into Violent Extremism II, p. 37-39. 
20 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 17. 
21 CRENSHAW, M., Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts, p. 7. 
22 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 17. 
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2. Radicalization and Terrorism 
 
Radicalization and terrorism are inseparable,24 the latter is one of the 
many results of the former.25 To avoid any ambiguity, by radicalization we 
mean a non-linear process of “development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in 
support of any group or cause in conflict”,26 with increased motivation “to use 
violent means against members of an out-group or symbolic targets”.27 
Radicalization can be identified in non-state groups, as well as in 
governments and/or state-sponsored agents,28 although many governments and 
agents are reluctant to admit it.29 The only ostensible difference is that 
governments have agents with a specific uniform and insignia.30 Democratic 
and developed states are also not immune; radicalization can be demonstrated, 
for example, by resorting to the practice of torture, which does not conform to 
international human rights standards.31 This could be reached by hardening 
foreign policies and, for example, having more conservative borders policy. 
Moreover, by de-radicalization, we mean the reverse process of radicalization, 
i.e. “the process of becoming less radical”,32 thus, less violent. 
Based on Peace and Conflict studies, radicalization is the escalation of 
conflict towards violence and de-radicalization is the de-escalation of conflict 
from violence. Although Friedrich Glasl33 did not present his Conflict 
Escalation Model as a direct explanation of (de)radicalization, we believe that 
this model can be applied to better understand the complexity of 
(de)radicalization in the framework on conflict. Glasl presented the conflict 
escalation as a downward movement, where conflict parties are pulled into a 
negative spiral of competition. In a series of stairs and falls, parties (individuals 
or groups) increase their competition through nine stages, which are in turn 
divided into three levels, i.e. win-win, win-lose, and lose-lose. These escalations 
are neither linear nor one-way travelled; conflict parties may pass through these 
                                                          
24 VELDHUIS, T.; BAKKER, E., Causale factoren van radicalisering en hun onderlinge 
samenhang, p. 454. 
25 SCHMID, A. P., Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation, p. 18. 
26 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 4. 
27 DOOSJE, B. et al., Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization, p. 79. 
28 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 223. 
29 FITZ-GIBBON, A., Talking to Terrorists, Non-Violence, and Counter-Terrorism, p. 21. 
30 FITZ-GIBBON, A., Talking to Terrorists, Non-Violence, and Counter-Terrorism, p. 21. 
31 SCHMID, A. P., Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation, p. 37-38. 
32 Demant, F.; Slootman, M.; Buijs, F.; Tillie, J., Decline and Disengagement, p. 13. 
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stages either in an upward direction or in a downward one. These movements 
are dependent on conflict dynamics. Glasl34 also provided strategies for de-
escalation, which also could represent the de-radicalization process. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Every phenomenon can be studied from different perspectives, and the 
immensely diverse body of literature around (de)radicalization is proving this.35 
The current (de)radicalization discourse can be criticized for the fact that the 
majority of scholars have ignored the peace and conflict studies perspective, 
while focusing mainly on security, legal, and psychological aspects. Therefore, 
we chose to study the (de)radicalization phenomena, using the peace and conflict 
studies perspective and, in particular, through the conflict transformation 
lenses;36 studying radicalization as a conflict. Slavoj Zizek argued there are not 
only wrong answers but also most crucial wrong questions, because the way the 
problem is perceived is part of the problem.37 On the one hand, the 
multidisciplinary approach of the conflict transformation lenses provides an 
inclusive understanding of the problem, avoiding narrow and wrong questions. 
On the other hand, it results in a variety of prerequisite steps38 to describe the 
processes of (de)radicalization and to understand why it happens. 
The conflict transformation lenses are based on a fundamental element: 
i.e. every social conflict should “make-sense”.39 This element is a revelation of 
a key aspect in the understanding of radicalization: although it might not be 
comforting for some, radicalization and its results, including violence, 
extremism, and terrorism should make sense. Thus, radicalization can occur for 
either good or bad causes and is not about being right or wrong.40 Hence, moral 
outrage can be a driving factor for violence; therefore, terrorists can also be 
fighting for social justice, at least from their “perceived” reality.41 Similarly, 
the philosopher Karl Popper wrote, “All things living are in search of a better 
                                                          
34 GLASL, F., Konfliktmanagement. 
35 LUITEN, H.; DE GRAAF, S., Begrijp jij het Midden-Oosten nog?, p. 131; YOUNG, H. F.; 
ROOZE, M.; HOLSAPPEL, J., Translating conceptualizations into practical suggestions, p. 213. 
36 LEDERACH, J. P., Little Book of Conflict Transformation. 
37 ZIZEK, S., There are not only wrong answers, but also wrong questions Philosopher Slavoj 
Zizek on the importance of asking the right questions. 
38 LEDERACH, J. P., Little Book of Conflict Transformation, p. 7-11. 
39 LEDERACH, J. P., Conflict Transformation. 
40 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 13. 
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world. Men, animals, plants, even unicellular organisms are constantly 
active”.42 The former undercover CIA officer Amaryllis Fox, who worked on 
counter-terrorism for almost ten years, described it as well by arguing that “we 
all think that we are the good guys”.43 
Making sense does not mean excusing, accepting, or justifying in any way 
the use of violence by any party, but only means understanding the root causes 
behind the violent behavior. These violent acts were, are, and will always be 
considered horrific and amoral; familiarity with them does not make them any 
more acceptable or justifiable,44 “it just makes them more (psycho-) logical”,45 
because normalizing violence hurts everyone.46 Nevertheless, making sense of 
radicalization also means the application of another fundamental element in 
conflict transformation, which is the re-humanization of the enemy by 
differentiating between the evil and the evildoers.47 “Put simply, something 
you’ve done doesn’t have to constitute the sum of who you are”.48 
The re-humanization process breaks the monster myth by realizing that 
these evildoers also have personal and positive human needs, because, “how 
will we understand what it is in human societies that produces violence if we 
refuse to recognize the humanity of those who commit it?”.49 To prevent, 
discourage, and stop people from turning to violence, we first have to 
understand why they are doing it; otherwise, it is impossible to mitigate its 
effects, which will most likely always tend to become more violent.50 
Additionally, acknowledging the survival goal of the extremist and 
terrorist (groups) by not limiting their goals into fighting states and terrorizing 
their citizens is another important step after the re-humanization element. 
Extremist and terrorist organizations, like any other organizations, have further 
goals, such as consensus building and recruitment.51 This step further helps to 
understand the problem of radicalization; thus, providing the opportunity to 
create the means to deal with it.52 
                                                          
42 POPPER, K., In Search of a Better World, p. vii. 
43 FOX, A., Former Undercover CIA Officer Talks War and Peace. 
44 POWELL, J., Talking to terrorists, p. 11. 
45 DOOSJE, B. et al., Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization, p. 82. 
46 FAHS, H., على مسؤليتي , p. 53. 
47 FAHS, H., على مسؤليتي , p. 53. 
48 ELVA, T., Thordis Elva and Tom Stranger. 
49 ELVA, T., Thordis Elva and Tom Stranger. 
50 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 4. 
51 DELLA PORTA, D., Left-wing terrorism in Italy, p. 126. 









This paper aims to find a way of identifying mechanisms of de-
radicalization by understanding political violence from peace and conflict 
studies perspectives. The empirical data that inform this paper are drawn from 
a case study that examined the radicalization and de-radicalization processes of 
23 ex-combatants from Lebanon. The participants are 19 males and 4 females 
from diverse religious, sectarian, social, economic, regional, and educational 
backgrounds; self-selecting as ex-combatants, who were (partly) involved in 
the so called Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and its preceding and subsequent 
related fightings, and who are currently living “civil lives” as relatively 
integrated members of their society. It should be noted that all names have been 
changed to protect their identities. 
The case study was conducted end of spring 2017 till fall 2018, in person 
through seven in-depth, semi-structured interviews and one focus group 
discussions (FGD) with 20 participants. The data were collected and analyzed 
using the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) method.  
During the personal interviews, participants had the opportunity and time 
to tell their stories, and to disclose more sensitive and intimate information. The 
focus group discussions, moreover, offered a platform for attendees to discuss 
their experiences, to form a dialogue about issues important to them, and to 
challenge each other’s opinions. Nevertheless, the participants encouraged each 
other, directly and indirectly, to share more personal, specific stories, just as 
focus group discussions are intended to, by offering “an opportunity to observe 
the process of collective sense-making”.53 
The framework for the data collection was the Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). The participants were chosen using a 
purposive sampling (not randomized), where a small number of participants 
were chosen precisely because of their experiences.54 Initially, contact was 
established with individuals who had previously published about or publicly 
shared their (de)radicalization stories, while later on, a few civil society and 
non-governmental organizations working on de-radicalization, reconciliation 
and dialogue, and peace building in Lebanon were also contacted. Potential 
interviewees were listed, and five pilot meetings were conducted. 
                                                          
53 WILKINSON, S., Focus group methodology, p. 193. 
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Interviews were held at any location chosen by the participants. The Lebanese 
dialect of Arabic was always used. The interview times ranged between one and four 
hours, while the focus group time was four hours, with a break in between. 
The participants lived in a society that had experienced vast political 
upheaval and violence. Simply put, several different crises and wars had occurred 
during and after the Lebanese independence from the French colonization 1943-
1946. The peak period was between 1975 and 1990, which is known as the 
Lebanese Civil War. Besides this war, which welcomed a lot of (inter)national 
and regional interference, as well as local and foreign fighters, new crises 
continued to emerge parallel to the old, unresolved ones. During their lifetimes, 
from around the 1950s, the interviewees faced a variety of political, cultural, 
religious, and social issues, not very different from what the region and the world 
are facing today. This made them feel the need to adopt violence for different 
reasons and causes; be it political, social, economic, and/or existential, and to join 
or establish military groups that appealed to their call. One participant, at the 
young age of seven, was receiving his first military training at school, while yet 
another joined a militia at twenty-two years old. Their average age of being 
involved in political violence was around sixteen years old. 
The collected raw data consisted of the transcribed data from the 
interviews and focus group discussion in the Lebanese dialect of Arabic. Back 
in 2017, qualitative analysis computer programs did not support a user-friendly 
Arabic language analysis; therefore, the analysis of the collected data was 
conducted manually. Complete translation and later data entry would make the 
analysis even more complicated. 
The Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)55 approach was 
chosen for this case study because it focuses on the meaning-making56 activity 
and helps the researchers “to explore in detail how participants are making 
sense of their personal and social world”,57 as they are the experts of their 
world’s perspectives.58 
IPA requires a two-stage interpretation process for the meaning-making 
activity, where “the participants are trying to make sense of their world; the 
researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of 
                                                          
55 SMITH, J. A.; OSBORN, M., Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, p. 53-80. 
56 The meaning-making activity is “the process of how individuals make sense of knowledge, 
experience, relationships, and the self” (IGNELZI, M., Meaning‐Making in the Learning and 
Teaching Process, p. 5). 
57 IGNELZI, M., Meaning‐Making in the Learning and Teaching Process, p. 53. 
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their world”.59 The interpretation phase by the researchers of this study began 
by re-writing the interpretation of each participant, of the interviews and the 
focus group discussions, as a personal story. In the second phase, each story 
was divided into two stories – the radicalization process and the de-
radicalization process, taking into consideration some overlapping pieces. 
In the third phase, conflict analysis tools were used to categorize each sub-
story into themes and sub-themes. In the fourth phase, themes and sub-themes were 
analyzed. In the fifth stage, sub-stories were compared with each other’s and 
crosscutting elements were highlighted. The results of the analysis were translated 
into English by the authors using the free-translation method and following an 
Arabic linguistic concept called “Bitassaruf” – (بتصرف) where the translation and 
the structure are made upon the translators’ understanding of the original texts. 
 
5. Validity and Reliability 
 
Every study is impeded by various limitations caused by the chosen 
methods of research. Besides the critiques of the interrelated issues of 
methodological rigor and the researchers’ subjectivity, single-case studies, using 
mainly qualitative methodologies, are often questionable when it comes to 
reliability and validity, both internal and external. On one hand, the subjective 
nature of qualitative studies often makes reliability difficult,60 while on the other 
hand, Lincoln and Guba61 argue that the replicability criterion is a naïve concept, 
especially when studying complex phenomena. The authors sought to increase 
the reliability of this study through conceptualizing the main concepts and terms, 
both theoretically and in the field, and by applying Creswell’s62 criteria of 
creating, following, and disclosing the framework of procedures for the field 
study and analysis. Hence, the resulting clear definitions, methods, and contexts 
would enable a second researcher to understand and apply a similar strategy. The 
internal validity of this study, which concerns the relationship of causes and 
effects of (de)radicalization, is maintained by accurately reflecting upon “the 
social world of those participating in the study”,63 through building the analysis 
                                                          
59 SMITH, J. A.; OSBORN, M., Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, p. 53. 
60 DAYMON, C.; HOLLOWAY, I., Qualitative research methods in public relations and 
marketing communications, p. 90. 
61 LINCOLN, Y. S.; GUBA, E. G., Naturalistic inquiry, p. 293. 
62 CRESWELL, J. W., Research design. 
63 DAYMON, C.; HOLLOWAY, I. Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and 
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on the personal words and perceptions of interviewees, not only on the 
interpretations of the authors. The external validity, i.e. generalizability, 
determines whether the results and findings are socially representative and 
academically relevant.64 Even though the interviewees come from a relatively 
wide variety of backgrounds, to verify if the results of this research have a strong 
external validity, inside or outside Lebanon, can only be done through further 
comparative research. However, the results of the discussions with the 
participants about the generalizability of their experiences by comparing their 
cases with other previous or current “extremists or terrorists”, inside or outside 




With the help of various conflict analyses tools, we categorized and 
analyzed our data. Using the Conflict Tree tool (Figure 1), we visualized the 
relationships between radicalization, its causes, and its effects. By causes, we 
mean both the root causes and the context causes (normality) of political 
violence, and by effects, we mean the political violence itself. 
 
Figure 1: Conflict Tree of Radicalization (adapted from Working with Conflict (RTC).65 
                                                          
64 DAYMON, C.; HOLLOWAY, I., Qualitative research methods in public relations and 
marketing communications, p. 91. 




 PqTeo, Rio de Janeiro, v. 3, n. 6, p. 394-431, jul./dez. 2020        405 
ISSN 2595-9409 
DOI: 10.46859/PUCRio.Acad.PqTeo.2595-9409.2020v3n6p394 
The Sources and Pillars tool (Figure 2) was used to visualize differences 
within the root causes, dividing them into underlying sources (driving factors) 
of the radicalization and the pillars (advantages and disadvantages of political 
violence) that hold radicalization and its effects in place. 
 
 
Figure 2: Sources and Pillars of Radicalization (adapted from Working with Conflict (RTC).66 
 
The Force-Field Analysis tool (Figure 3) helped us visualize the important 
difference between helping forces (supporting de-radicalization, i.e. disadvantages 
of political violence), and hindering forces (supporting radicalization, i.e. 
advantages of political violence). Identifying the advantages of political violence 
did not aim to show the goodness of violence, but to stress on the reality of people 
who used it and the advantages that they got, shedding light on the complex mixture 
between the absurd and the reasonable aspects of violence. Actually, this theme 
could help Fighter for Peace (FfP67), and other organizations, to know what to 
tackle, when they are approaching new generations.68  
                                                          
66 FISHER, S. et al., Working with Conflict. 
67 Fighters for Peace (FfP) is an organization in the Middle East that brings ex-fighters and ex-
combatants from different backgrounds together, to support them to become fighters for peace 
(http://fightersforpeace.org/). 
68 Although all the participants accepted to disclose their real names and identities, we decided to follow 
the recommendation of L. CORTI, A. DAY, and G. BACKHOUSE (Confidentiality and Informed 
Consent, para. 21), who suggested replacing identifying details, i.e. interviewees’ names, with 
pseudonyms. In this way, the data is anonymized but remain authentic (CORTI, L.; DAY, A.; 








Figure 3: Force-Filed Analysis and Pillars of Radicalization (adapted from Working 
with Conflict (RTC).69 
 
Finally, the combination of Conflict Tree and Sources and Pillars (Figure 
4) provided the complete visualization of radicalization analyzed as a conflict. 
 
Figure 4: The Combination of Conflict Tree and Pillars of Radicalization (adapted 
from Working with Conflict (RTC).70 
                                                          
referred to, using the following codes: focus group discussions with the ex-fighters (FGD, Date); personal 
interview with an ex-fighter (PI, Alias, Date), and all the twenty-three participants (FGD and PIs). 
69 FISHER, S. et al., Working with Conflict. 
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7. Concepts and Terms 
 
Since the main concepts of this paper have political connotations, we also 
discussed the meaning of (de)radicalization, extremism, and terrorism with the 
participants from a humanitarian point of view. The discussions pointed out that 
violence is the common ground of these terms, as radicalization, terrorism, and 
extremism are problematic due to the violence that they might produce.71 
Participants agreed that differences between the terms are very blurred and 
precarious because they are highly politically oriented,72 “The most powerful 
party always determines the meaning of the terms”.73 (De)radicalization, 
extremism, and terrorism are relative to time, place, and context.74 From now 
on, we will use the term Normality of Violence to refer to this relativity, which 
is crucial in understanding the studied cases, as this relativity played a major 
role in the studied (de)radicalization processes. 
To explain the Normality of Violence, it is important to explain what is 
meant by violence. For the purpose of this study, the definition of violence was 
based on the understanding of the participants from their own contexts. The 
participants75 defined violence as a variety of verbal, physical, social, 
psychological, structural, and cultural behaviors or attitudes. One participant 
explained, “When dialogue stops, violence starts”, another elaborated, 
“Violence is when we don’t dialogue about our daily life’s problems and 
conflicts”, a third clarified, “Violence is the culture of ‘me or no one else’” 
Other participants gave more specific examples, “Any practice of obedience or 
giving orders is violence, especially when it disrespects and blocks the 
development of other human beings and their innovative life”. Power, force, 
authority, preached hatred, enforcement of behavior or attitude, inequality, 
infringement, injustice, deprivation, and humiliation of human dignity were 
central in their definitions of violence. For example, making change by power 
or force; stealing other’s decision, life, material, or spiritual properties; and 
using any means against others obliging them to behave, believe, or adopt one’s 
own truth, values, and views, “Violence is any coercion or murder, and 
everything in between”. 
                                                          
71 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
72 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
73 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
74 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
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Normality, the first part of the term, represents what the society 
considered, from the above definitions of violence, to be Normal, and what 
rewards are offered for committing any of them. In other words, the Normality 
of Violence is the combination of what, in a society, is considered to be violent 
and what is not. Plus, how the society would appeal to the person who takes or 
doesn’t take violent actions. For example, society might categorize killing as 
violence but might treat the killer as a hero in specific situations. Tim76 
explained, “In the war, social pressure played a big role in me choosing between 
being either a coward [i.e. not fighting] or a hero [i.e. killing the enemy]”. 
Therefore, what is normal is shaped by context, time, and place, i.e., what is 
normal in wartime is different during ceasefires, partially clarifying why 
wartime or political instability catalyzes and initiates more radicalization 
processes. Nowadays, the influence of instability is not limited to the local 
(unstable) society, but has a worldwide influence due to globalization, as 
discussed by Hafez and Mullins.77 A Lower Normality of Violence78 means that 
fewer actions are considered violent with promised positive rewards – i.e. 
relatively easier radicalization path. A Higher Normality of Violence means 
more actions are categorized as violent with negative rewards for the 
perpetrators – i.e. relatively harder radicalization path. 
 
8. Non-controversial Mechanisms of Radicalization79 
 
“I wanted to fight and kill the entire universe”, is how one participant in 
the Focus Group Discussion80 expressed the effect that social and economic 
marginalization had on his life.81 He explained that the difficulty he faced in 
                                                          
76 PI, Tim, 1 June 2017. 
77 HAFEZ, M.; MULLINS, C.; The Radicalization Puzzle, p. 959. 
78 The utilization of comparative adjectives aims to stress on the relative nature of status of the 
Normality of Violence. It is always a comparative status, compared to Normality of Violence in 
different time, place and/or contexts. 
79 By non-controversial mechanisms, we mean the already extensively discussed mechanisms 
(personal, group, or mass; macro, micro or miso), which are common among various literature. 
We linked the mechanisms found in our studied cases to already existing models of radicalization 
presented by C. R. McCauley and S. Moskalenko (MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., 
Mechanisms of Political Radicalization; MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction) and 
Doosje et al. (DOOSJE, B. et al., Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization). Among many 
others, these two models were chosen as they took into consideration the complexity of the 
conflictual situation a radical consider themselves in. 
80 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
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adapting to a new life after migrating from the village to the city, made him feel 
socially marginalized and ostracized by society. Similarly, other men and 
women in the FGD pointed out different kinds of grievances as driving factors 
for their radicalization, such as social persecution and discrimination, poverty 
and deprivation, social and economic inequality, occupation and wars, and 
social and structural injustice. One woman explained, “I used violence as a 
reaction to greater violence”. Another man added, “Victims of various forms of 
violence enter the spiral of violence by seeking revenge”. An overwhelming 
academic consensus exists around these driving factors, which McCauley and 
Moskalenko82 framed as Personal Grievances. 
Luca’s83 slippery slope to violence84 started from dividing football teams; 
Christians vs. Muslims, and ended up with dividing societies. It took Daniel85 
many steps before he was actually able to kill with his own hands, triggered by 
a driving factor which Doosje et al86 call “gaining loyalty” from his comrades.87 
Elena88 started with disobeying her parents, then, after joining the party and 
serving in “women’s jobs”, finally ended up fighting herself. 
The love mechanism89 was crucial in Tim’s life.90 He accepted to join 
military training due to the social influence of his brother.91 One FGD 
participant explained, “I was 12 years old when my father told me that there are 
no other ways to survive other than militant training and by keeping our fingers 
on the trigger… Instead of teaching me mathematics they taught me how to use 
a Kalashnikov”.92 Actually, all the participants underscored the role of the love 
mechanism93 within their in-group, where their in-group ties, cohesion, 
commitment, and loyalty to other in-group members drove their radicalization 
even further. 
                                                          
82 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
83 PI, Luca, 24 May 2017. 
84 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
85 PI, Daniel, 25 May 2017. 
86 DOOSJE, B. et al., Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. 
87 PI, Daniel 25 May 2017. 
88 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
89 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
90 PI, Tim, 1 June 2017. 
91 PI, Tim, 1 June 2017. 
92 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
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Being alone and seeking revenge, known as the unfreezing mechanism94 
played a key role in Julian’s radicalization.95 Being separated from his family, 
which was under siege, Julian found himself alone seeking support to help his 
family. The only opportunity he found was to join a militia, which promised to 
free the under siege area, where his family was stuck. Likewise, Stefan’s new 
life of misery affected his social life, which one militant group, filled.96 The 
military group offered Stefan a sense of belonging and a platform of growth. 
In the personal interview with Julian,97 he kept stressing on his high 
status during the war, and how easy it was for him to “attract women”. He also 
emphasized his attraction to thrill seeking and risky situations, fitting the risk 
and status mechanism.98 Elena99 also strived to better her position always 
outstanding and attempting to attract the highest in command, for “it was not 
possible to marry a normal fighter; I wanted to marry a high ranking leader”. 
Stefan100 was frank about his intention to wear the uniform to attract the girls at 
his school. Luca’s Friends101 saw him as a strong and muscular young man, and 
he did not want to disappoint them. Various Lebanese militias used the status 
attraction as a reward for joining the political violence.102 One participant 
explained, “They gave me ‘military’ training in school when I was twelve years 
old. As a daily reward, they gave us a Kalashnikov, emptied from bullets, to 
hold and sleep with at night, honestly, because we perceived the weapon as our 
own beautiful and sexy woman”. 
The group mechanisms of group polarization, group competition, and 
group isolation,103 were largely present as driving factors in all of the cases.104 
On the one hand, a good number of participants believed that they adopted 
violence because it was the decision of the group to do so. Luca105 and Elena106 
were clear examples of this. On the other hand, two male participants in the 
                                                          
94 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
95 PI, Julian, 11 June 2017. 
96 PI, Stefan, 28 May 2017. 
97 PI, Julian, 11 June 2017. 
98 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
99 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
100 PI, Stefan, 28 May 2017. 
101 PI, Luca, 24 May 2017. 
102 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
103 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
104 FGD and PIs. 
105 PI, Luca, 24 May 2017. 
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focus group disagreed, stressing that it was their own decision, “I went out 
myself and searched for a party, where I could use violence to achieve my 
goals”.107 Another participant explained, “I belonged to a political group which 
did not want to join in the war back then, so I went to another ally group, which 
was fighting, wanting to join them. They did not take me, but instead told me 
to go back to my group because they would soon be joining the war, which is 
exactly what happened. So, I was already looking for violence, and I did not 
join the war because of the party’s orders”. One participant added that he was 
influenced by the discussions in his society and his in-group, which supported 
violence as the ultimate means to an end. 
All the respondents identified society’s role as an indispensable element. 
One FGD participant divided this role into four levels: 1) 
family/parents/friends, 2) schools/teachers/classmates, 3) social and cultural 
contexts, and 4) political context and vision.108 The participants claimed that 
the culture around them prepared them physically and mentally to be ready to 
fight, and under certain circumstances, even pushed them fight because it was 
the moral, normal, and necessary choice. A female participant clarified, “We 
inherited a culture of power and patriarchy, the culture of ‘you are a man’. Our 
parents, religion, political parties, and society all gave us violent role models, 
such as Salah Eddine, Hercules, St. Georges, Aantar Eben Shadad, Fakher 
Eddine, and other historic and/or legendary heroes”. 
Another contributor added:  
 
The culture of bourgeoisie kills natural human development. It shapes 
individuals according to old traditions, where people learn to distinguish 
themselves and segregate society according to classes. As a result of this 
culture, you understand power and authority as your servant, and 
therefore, you empower it blindly as long as the authority is maintaining 
the old system that suits you.109 
 
Moreover, one participant stressed how “the traditional education that 
we received, along with the ignorance of the others exaggerated the cultural 
differences that we were living in. When the media came in, these differences 
became a bigger problem”.110 
                                                          
107 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
108 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
109 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
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Likewise, various respondents named hatred and martyrdom111 as very 
influential mechanisms.112 
 
The culture of fear, created by religious and political leaders and 
empowered by the media, made us ready to use violence whenever it was 
possible or needed, especially because we were almost ignorant of our 
enemy, whom we feared. We only knew that the enemy hated us and their 
only objective was to kill us.113 
 
These results align with the driving factors of the social environment, 
propaganda, and confrontation with death and violence. The Jujitsu politics 
mass mechanism that McCauley and Moskalenko114 described, influenced 
Elena’s115 and Stefan’s116 thinking. They sympathized with the Palestinian 
cause and channeled their hatred against the Lebanese Authorities due to its 
tough reactions and treatment of the Palestinians. 
 
9. Controversial Mechanisms of Radicalization117 
 
9.1. I did not know – I did not trust 
 
Various participants118 identified one element, which we refer to as I did 
not know – I did not trust, although weak in the literature, as a driving factor in 
their radicalization processes. “I did not know that there is an alternative to 
violence. Today, after I joined Fighter for Peace (FfP), I have learned about a 
variety of non-violent approaches… I wish, I knew these means before, so that 
maybe I would not have joined the war”.119 One respondent explained, “I was 
ignorant about conflict transformation approaches and the nonviolent and 
peaceful culture. Our parents, schools, and society did not teach us because, 
maybe, violence was an international culture and approach; they were unaware 
                                                          
111 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
112 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
113 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
114 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction. 
115 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
116 PI, Stefan, 30 May 2017. 
117 By controversial mechanisms, we mean mechanisms, which are usually very weak in the 
literature and or scholars are not on consensus of their role in the radicalization process. 
118 FGD and PIs. 
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of an effective alternative”. Another added, “We were children, they [parents, 
social environment, political and religious leaders] taught us to use violence. I 
believed and I was totally convinced that violence is the only means and way 
of protecting our existence and identity in order to make a good change”. 
One participant pointed out that it is not only the absence of nonviolent 
means, but also the lack of effectiveness of and the lack of trust in those means, 
“we did not trust the non-violent or peaceful means, or believe in the 
effectiveness of any alternative means other than violence. Because you could 
use nonviolent means for seven hundred thousand years, but the occupation 
would still remain”. Finally, one participant added, “it was not only about 
learning alternative means to violence, but it was also about how we perceived 
violence and the double standards that might overcome our rationality… I used 
to think that our revolutionary violence was good, but their reactionary and 




Ideology is often considered in various academic debates to be a major 
driver and/or motive for political radicalization and violence. It is important to 
mention that most of the academic discussions have been on foreign fighters, 
the home-grown terrorist phenomenon, or terrorists attacking the Western 
world.120 In this same way, some of the participants of the study did consider 
ideology as a driving factor for their radicalization.121 A deeper analysis of 
Luca’s, Daniel’s, and Elena’s processes supports the role of ideology in the 
rationalization and justification of their decision to join the violence, as 
described by McCauley and Moskalenko.122 In other words, ideology is the tool 
which activates the meaning-making process; it is the umbrella under which a 
new violent life gains its sense. Luca, Daniel, and Elena, similarly to all the 
other participants,123 claimed that their very existence and survival were 
important factors in their radicalization process, and their decision to join the 
war. This analysis is not limited to the Lebanese case study; Christian 
Picciolini, a former extremist, shares a similar opinion, “I think ultimately 
people become extremists not necessarily because of the ideology. I think that 
ideology is simply a vehicle to be violent. I believe that people become 
                                                          
120 HAFEZ, M.; MULLINS, C. The Radicalization Puzzle. 
121 PI, Luca, 24 May 2017; PI, Daniel, 25 May 2017; and PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
122 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 220. 
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radicalized, or extremist because they’re searching for three very fundamental 
human needs: identity, community and a sense of purpose”.124  
Nevertheless, three crucial questions arise here: 
1) Is ideology only a justification for the past or also for current 
actions/behavior, which aim to fulfill certain human needs, or can it also trigger 
people to behave violently in the future? The case study findings revealed that 
ideologies also offer dreams for a better future, where the underlying problems 
of the previous unfulfilled needs are perceptively solved. As Daniel elaborated:  
 
What drove me to violence was fear and self-defense as defensive 
mechanisms, as well as the goal of building a Christian nationalist nation 
as an offensive mechanism. The Christian nation as a political ambition 
is offensive because the idea is not only to protect ourselves, but also to 
annihilate the other. We wanted to have power and to purify the land.125  
 
But one woman added, “If it is possible to fulfil the needs of the youth 
and provide them with alternative non-violent possibilities to achieve what they 
think might gain in the war, then ultimately, they will not be violent 
anymore”.126 Another participant added, “Violence is usually perceived to be 
used as a defensive means, but it ends being an offensive one geared at 
achieving different interests”. This understanding fits Glasl’s127 conflict 
escalation model, where ideologies start to play a role in the middle of the 
escalation, i.e. at the fifth stage: “Loss of Face”, in which parties lose their 
moral credibility, and the conflict moves to the win-lose situation. Hannah 
Arendt explained, from a philosophical perspective, “The need of reason is not 
inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning”.128  
2) How much do ideologies influence actions? There is consensus in the 
political discourse that separates between beliefs and actions.129 Equally, 
overwhelming evidence in social psychology confirms that beliefs alone are 
weak predictors of actions. Ideology and actions are only sometimes connected, 
but not always,130 because a very small number of people, who follow a specific 
                                                          
124 WILLIAMS, J.; SMITH, S., A Reformed White Nationalist Speaks Out On Charlottesville. 
125 PI, Daniel, 25 May 2017. 
126 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
127 GLASL, F., Konfliktmanagement. 
128 ARENDT, H., The Life of the Mind, p. 15. 
129 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 220. 
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violent ideology, move all the way to violence, extremism, and/or terrorism.131 
McCauley and Moskalenko132 argue that ideology is too simple and too broad 
a mechanism to be considered in understanding radicalization. They purport 
that many radicalization pathways to extremism do not involve ideology, 
similar to the cases of Stefan,133 Tim,134 and Julian.135  
Dissonance Theory supports this argument, proposing that humans tend to 
change their opinions to fit their behavior to reduce the inconsistency between 
their desired positive self-image and their perceived bad behavior.136 People 
come up with reasons to justify or excuse their bad behavior because it is easier 
than acting only according to what is reasonable; according to their ideology.137 
3) If it is true that ideology is only a rationalization/justification, how 
should de-radicalization programs or authorities deal with it? A study by 
Norman and Mikhael138 stressed that policymakers should not focus on “the 
intricacies or appeal of the ideology itself”, but on the process of radicalization, 
especially because similarities can be found in a variety of “radicalization 
processes across different ideologies and contexts”. 
The discussion above suggests that the only way to overcome ideologies 
is through actions, which, in turn, can create a counter-reality to overcome 
ideologies. Therefore, identifying ideology as a mechanism of radicalization is 
a deviation from the focus and the goal, because understanding radicalization 
from the lenses of ideology creates opposite ideologies. These are, in turn, a 
wrong perception of reality, for even though they address real problems, they 
end up mystifying the solutions.139 Simply put, the importance and ranking of 
ideology in the (de)radicalization studies should neither be exaggerated nor 
reduced, but instead taken seriously. 
 
10. Advantages of Political Violence 
 
The goal of discussing the advantages of violence is to point out what 
issues are to be addressed in any de-radicalization program. It clarifies what is 
                                                          
131 DOOSJE, B. et al., Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization, p. 79. 
132 MCCAULEY, C. R.; MOSKALENKO, S., Friction, p. 5, 219-220. 
133 PI, Stefan, 28 May 2017. 
134 PI, Tim, 1 June 2017. 
135 PI, Julian, 11 June 2017. 
136 FESTINGER, L., A theory of cognitive dissonance. 
137 FESTINGER, L., A theory of cognitive dissonance. 
138 NORMAN, J.; MIKHAEL, D., Youth radicalization is on the rise. 
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to be done to create alternative paths for individuals to dismiss violence and to 
instead use alternative non-violent means, when they are trying to realize their 
motives and interests. Although one participant140 claimed at first that, “It is not 
easy to find them”, the group discussed a variety of benefits, advantages, and 
gains, which the authors then ordered into five categories of advantages: 1) 
existential, survival, and becoming; 2) skills and competencies; 3) belonging 
and intimate relationships; 4) status, power, and fame; and 5) political, social 
and cultural. 
1) “Political violence saved my existence”, claimed one participant.141 
Another added, “the war created a valuable goal worth living and fighting for. 
It makes you feel proud and strong”. Many participants affirmed that the war 
gave meaning to their life, and a perceived change to become a better person. 
Daniel142 and Elena143 elaborated on the meaning of life that the war gave them, 
and stressed the importance of the combatants’ reintegration when they drop 
their weapons, since “After the war, many fighters committed suicide because 
they lost their life’s meaning. The only thing that they knew was fighting”.144 
2) FGD participants’ talked about various skills and competencies that 
they gained during their participation in political violence.145 They claim to 
have learned about such life and survival skills as how to communicate, how to 
convince, how to survive, and how to manage. They were also empowered in 
other skills and competencies such as leadership, adaptability, cultural 
awareness, among other personal and public skills.  
3) Belonging and establishment of intimate relationships are two main 
advantages of radicalization. The participants146 affirmed the deep and close 
relationships and friendships, within their closed social environment, that the 
war offered them, “My relations with my comrades were stronger than my 
relationship with my family”.147 This spirit of identity and belonging, coupled 
with high levels of trust, honesty, cooperation, and love permeated the 
relationships among the comrades, “There is no better name than comrade”. 
The isolation that they had experienced due to political violence provided the 
fighters with an alternative family, where they had the chance to meet with 
                                                          
140 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
141 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
142 PI, Daniel, 25 May 2017. 
143 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017 
144 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
145 FGD, 28 May 2017. 
146 FGD and PIs. 
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different people “with whom we shared the same goals and objectives, and a 
similar understanding of life”. Political violence also offered a lot of sexual 
benefits and intimate relationships. Elena explained:  
 
In wartime, love relationships follow more of a survivor approach 
because sex means creation and war means death. You compensate your 
need for life through sex, especially because the social boundaries are 
completely broken; thus, casual sex becomes easier and more 
meaningful. Sex becomes the opposite of death.148 
 
Thus, women had more relationships with men, and vice-versa.149 
4) Status, power, and fame, combined with the advantages of the 
relationship made political violence very attractive,150 “I had the feeling that I 
was ‘the man’”.151 The feeling and practice of power, higher self-confidence, 
independence, respect, pride, and the sense of being needed and useful were the 
main outcomes of the status, power, and fame level, where “You feel you are 
strong and that people have to respect you and ask your help; you feel needed”. 
One participant called these advantages “social and political capital”. “I had a 
lot of social capital; I was accepted and respected because I defended our group 
and killed the enemy, and did what had to be done”. 
5) On the political, social, and cultural level, violence offered the fighters 
opportunities to make social, political, and economic changes to suit their 
interests. If the change was not possible or easy to make, violence at least 
empowered their political presence and status, making them a strong party in the 
conflict. In addition, one woman argued that the war proved the capability of 
women, enabling them to participate and lead in politics. Some kind of gender 
equality or at least a better gender balance was created. Moreover, one participant 
claimed, “in the war, the level of higher education among the poor was raised 
[through the financial support and scholarships offered by the empathizers and 
allies, mainly the Soviet Union]”. However, one participant objected, because he 
believed these things were done for political interests and not for the sake of the 
poor, “you pay more martyrs, you get more scholarships”, reminding everybody 
that political violence can only provide temporary perceived advantages. One 
woman concluded, “When you meet people’s needs and tackle the reasons which 
                                                          
148 PI, Elena, 27 May 2017. 
149 FGD, 28 May 2017 
150 FGD and PIs. 
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drive people to behave violently, then the violence will stop. If what we got as 
advantages from our engagement in the war can be provided for new generations 
by non-violent means, then, no one will adopt violence”. 
 
10.1. Violence: the Means of Achieving Peace 
 
The relationship between political violence and its advantages shifted the 
FGD towards a central question: does political violence ultimately aim to achieve 
peace? Although most of the ex-fighters did not think a lot about their highest 
goals during the daily fighting, “I used to live day by day, trying to perform my 
duties, and my only concern was to survive and help my group to conquer”. All 
of them agreed that at some point during their fighting, they took peace for 
granted as the ultimate objective of the political violence that they were engaged 
in. “Everything we were doing was, supposedly, leading to peace… Our party’s 
slogan, which we repeated almost every day, was ‘Free Nation – Happy People’, 
and we thought that we were fighting to achieve this slogan”.152 Their end goal 
of peace seemed to justify their violent means, “Through the violence, I was 
building peace for my people and my society”. Moreover, their missions of 
building peace were organically dependent on and affiliated with those who held 
authority and power. Thus, they considered peace as the ultimate result of the 
victory, “By conquering, you think you are building peace, because you believe 
that if you rule, peace and love will also rule naturally”.153  
In addition, security, protection, and liberation were considered as the 
major steps in their pursuit of peace. For example, one participant explained, 
“When you conquer a region or you protect your people, this is also partly 
building peace, despite using through violence”. Another added, “By freeing 
my country from the occupier and conquering my enemies, for sure I was 
building peace”, and a third elaborated, “The occupation was the reason for 
people’s problems. When you free the people from the occupation, then peace 
will come back accordingly”.154 
The discussion developed further and one participant asked, “are violence 
and war indispensable for the development of humanity?” All participants agreed 
that violence always leads to destruction, but only a few believed that nothing 
should justify it. The majority argued, “The only occasion in which you can use 
violence is when you are defending yourself”. The idea of self-defense was 
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expanded to include achieving political goals, “I built my peace by achieving my 
goals”. As a reaction, a participant speculated, “Every ideology aims ultimately 
to achieve peace, at least this is the belief of the ideology’s followers. Violence 
is only a temporary means, and sometimes it is indispensable”, while a second 
elaborated, “We believed that we had the perfect project and solution, you can 
call it Ideology. We thought if through violence we can achieve it, so let it be; 
because only through our project peace will be possible”.155 
Some participants meant that violence was indispensable. One ex-fighter 
stressed, “Violence is the only means of preserving your existence if you are 
threatened, and existence is a part of peace”. A second person added, “How do 
you fight an occupation- with flowers? No- with a gun, with explosives, with 
any power that you have”, and a third quoted a famous line of Renatus, “If you 
want peace, prepare for war”, and continued, “Peace can only be protected or 
achieved through war. Power should be faced with power. Violence should be 
faced with greater violence”. One participant concluded, “Listening to the 
opinion of different ex-fighters on the relationship between violence and peace 
gives us an understanding of how radical groups recruit new members. Then, 
we [FfP] have to see how we can counter these narratives”.156 
 
11. Mechanisms of De-radicalization 
 
The identified mechanisms, on the personal and context levels, were 
interdependent and highly interconnected. Although there was no one factor 
more important than the other and every participant had his/her own process, 
the context mechanisms were more prominent than the personal ones. 
 
11.1. Personal Mechanisms 
 
On the personal level, the following mechanisms were identified and will 
be described in more detail below. 
Contact Mechanism. On the personal level, contact with the different 
other was the main driving factor of de-radicalization. Contact happened for a 
variety of reasons. With some participants, it was obligatory due to their social 
or economic situation, especially after the end of the war. For others, it 
happened accidentally, or by the opportunity having been offered to them by an 
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organization (i.e. Daniel and Stefan). The contact mechanism of de-
radicalization fits within the Intergroup Contact Theory developed by 
Allport.157 In addition, the required criteria for positive contact158 were also 
crucial in the process of the participants. Daniel159 explained, “The oasis that 
‘Initiative of Change’160 offered me, where I had the chance to discover my 
enemy, worked because we both perceived it as a safe and free haven. We were 
treated equally, and we had the chance to interact on a personal level”. Actually, 
contact with the perceived enemy was a de-radicalization mechanism because 
it offered the participants three major opportunities: 1) breaking stereotypes, 2) 
re-humanization, and 3) comparing realities. 
1) Daniel clarified:  
 
When you have the chance to meet with the different other, you actually 
break and retune a variety of stereotypes and prejudices, which shape 
your reality. For example, I used to believe that Muslims always have 
many children but, after I met many Muslims, I discovered, first, that this 
is a stereotype and generalization. Second, even in cases where it was 
true and they had a high reproduction rate, I discovered that they were 
not doing it against me personally or against my identity as a Christian, 
but they were doing it, probably, for a variety of cultural and economic 
purposes or whatsoever. 161 
 
2) Contact did not only break stereotypes but also broke the isolation, 
which, in turn, broke the us vs. them perception.162 It created opportunities to 
once again rediscover the dignity, not only within the enemy in front of them, 
but also within themselves,163 to become aware of the prejudgments and 
ideologies that held them victim. Isolation dissolved their personal identities in 
the in-group identity, but contact restored it.164 An FGD participant explained, 
“Having the chance to meet the other helped me to discover that he/she is not a 
                                                          
157 ALLPORT, G.W.; CLARK, K.; PETTIGREW, T., The Nature of Prejudice. 
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160 Initiatives of Change (IofC) is a worldwide movement of people of diverse cultures and 
backgrounds, who are committed to the transformation of society through changes in human 
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monster but a human being like me”.165 Restoring the personal identity shed 
light on possibilities for various life-meanings, which were not related to the 
in-group.166 New life-meanings, in turn, formed a de-radicalization mechanism, 
which the authors will discuss later on in this section. 
3) Contact between enemies enabled them to compare their realities, to 
discover common interests or goals, and to widen their information resources. 
Discovering common goals or the possibility to work on something common 
was essential in the de-radicalization processes of Luca,167 Jan,168 and Tim.169 
Although Elena170 did not accept, in the beginning, that she shared common 
interests with the perceived enemy, her acceptance of the common reality 
empowered her de-radicalization process further, started a series of reflections 
and realizations. In the FGD, participants talked a lot about the role of their 
reflections and realizations in their own de-radicalization processes.171 They 
reevaluated their once perfect perception of the in-group and realized just how 
imperfect it actually was. They were able to take account of their current 
realities by admitting their failures of achieving their goals for a supposed better 
change, and realizing the lies and hypocrisy they were once living. One 
participant explained, “By breaking the lived hypocrisy and putting yourself in 
the shoes of the others, you ask yourself- if I do not accept being treated 
violently, why do I accept that this should happen to others?” Tim elaborated, 
“I don’t want people to suffer the same way anymore. I reviewed the high costs 
of the violence; I became aware of the big losses. I saw how bad the results of 
violence were, not only on the others but also on me. All of this with no big 
change, as, for example, corruption is still there and it became even bigger”.172 
Another participant added, “I realized the impossibility and in fact the 
unnecessity of changing the entire world… What we did – did not help to make 
any positive changes, but instead, negative ones”.173 The comparison of realities 
also helped the participants to make a variety of other discoveries, which could 
be divided into two categories. On the one hand, there were discoveries related 
to their in-group imperfections and deviations, i.e. corruption, independent 
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personal agendas of other in-group members or leaders that fed their personal 
benefits and power. One participant elaborated, “I used to judge my enemy for 
being tools in the hands of imperialism. Today, I believe that I was exactly the 
same as how I judged my enemy. I was a tool”.174 Another added, “At one point, 
I discovered that everything I am drawn to is actually politics, and politics is 
very dirty”. On the other hand, Elena175 and other FGD participants176 
discovered from new, alternative sources of information, non-violent 
approaches to deal with their issues. 
New Life-Meaning Mechanism. As mentioned above, a new life -
meaning was also a mechanism of de-radicalization.177 It occurred through 
contact, or due to other situations that emerged, for example, a newborn in case 
of Elena178 and Jan,179 or the natural loss of a loved one in the case of Stefan.180 
For some participants, growing old gave them more experience, thus, more 
attempts, failures, and successes, and consequently, more diverse life-meanings. 
“Through time, at one point, I realized that nothing is worth it. Nothing is worth 
dying or sacrificing yourself for”.181 The ex-white-extremist Christian Picciolini 
describes this mechanism nicely, “The only way to show them that there is 
nothing to hate, is to show them that there is something to love”.182 
New Treatment Mechanism. A third main mechanism of the political 
de-radicalization of the participants is the New Treatment, which is also related 
to the contact and life-meaning mechanisms. Through Contact, participants had 
the opportunity to be treated in a good and respectful manner. Moreover, the 
new treatment mechanism had an extra strong effect when it came from an out-
group member or a neutral person. The treatment that Daniel and Stefan got 
from Initiative of Change, which was blended with the contact mechanism, 
further catalyzed their de-radicalization processes. Maajid Nawaz, a British ex-
extremist, shared a similar experience, where the solidarity that he received 
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from a member of Amnesty International during his prison time in Egypt, 
initiated his de-radicalization process.183 
Love Mechanism. While love184 is a mechanism of radicalization, it is 
also, in turn, a mechanism of de-radicalization for the participants.185 Many FGD 
participants stressed that the de-radicalization of other comrades was a major 
factor driving their own de-radicalization processes, “I was highly encouraged to 
move further in rejecting and abandoning violence due to many friends that I met 
here at FfP”.186 Successful de-radicalization processes by others encouraged the 
ex-fighters to move ahead in their de-radicalization processes. 
Nonviolent Means Mechanism. Finally and in contrast to the I did not 
know – I did not trust mechanism of radicalization, the availability of effective 
nonviolent means played a definitive role in the de-radicalization processes of the 
twenty-three partakers. One FGD participant explained, “I am totally aware now 
of the importance of peace and non-violent means, and that is why I reject 
violence and I try to help others to do so as well through my commitment to FfP”. 
 
11.2. Context mechanisms 
 
As was discussed at the beginning of this section, while the personal 
mechanisms were important, the context mechanisms were more influential in 
the case of the study’s twenty-three respondents.187  
Conflict Regulator Mechanism. The main context mechanism was the 
conflict regulator, which included conquering (i.e. Jan and Tim) or being 
defeated (Daniel, Elena, Stefan, and Julian), changes in the power balance 
between the conflict parties (Elena and Stefan), new rules or regulations of the 
situation (Daniel, Luca, and Julian), and a shift in enemies or allies (Stefan). 
This finding positively correlates with the general conflict model designed by 
Ulrich Wagner (2005),188 which states that rules and norms can moderate 
conflictual interactions. 
Higher Normality of Violence Mechanism. The Normality of Violence 
is an influential context mechanism of political (de)radicalization. Although 
Julian kept his weapon after the end of the war, he never used it again due to the 
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Higher Normality of Violence.189 Similarly, Luca190 and Tim191 obeyed to their 
parties’ new decision in joining civilian life, despite the fact that they were not 
convinced to do so. Elena192 expressed, “Back then, I did not see myself as an 
extremist, but as a responsible person. However, if I were to judge myself today, 
I could clearly say I was an extremist”. Moreover, in the case of Daniel,193 the 
society was accepting and welcoming violence against the enemy, making the 
development of his radicalization towards violence ‘the normal’ due to the Lower 
Normality of Violence. The Normality of Violence is highly influenced by 
practices of dehumanization, as described in more details by Daniel Bar-Tal and 
Phillip Hammack.194 Many participants explained that what they did during the 
war was normal; however, they judged themselves in the discussions, as ex-
extremists or ex-terrorists. An important issue emerges here: the perceived reality 
of the participants is crucial for their decisions and for their judgments of their 
decisions (this is not limited to the participants, but to every person). 
Actually, the Normality of Violence led to another effective context 
mechanism, which worked best on the group level. Groups changed their 
attitudes and shifted towards rejecting violence. An FGD participant explained 
that some leaders had high social senses, in which they could sense the level of 
fatigue of violence in their societies, and decide accordingly whether to adopt 
or abandon violence.195 Another added that high pressure to end the war 
supported by an international climate affected his group decision to accept the 
end of the war. A female participant also explained that, in her case, a highly 
respected political leader went through a long personal process of de-
radicalization, which led him to adopt nonviolent approaches, and in turn, 




The findings of the case study point out clearly that, although the main 
factors that initiate or serve as a catalyst in the (de)radicalization processes might 
be common between different individuals, the (de)radicalization process of each 
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individual is unique, personal, and nonlinear. Moreover, the participants 
perceived the adoption and the use of violent means, including terrorism and 
violent extremism measures, as a normal, natural, and an essential decision taken 
within their context. Nevertheless, the role of the group was indispensable and 
fundamental in the (de)radicalization processes of the twenty-three participants. 
Studying (de)radicalization from the peace and conflict perspectives 
uncovers two new mechanisms, I did not know – I did not trust and the Normality 
of Violence mechanisms, which are fundamental driving factors in the 
(de)radicalization processes. Likewise, the results of this case study support the 
opinion that suggests minimal role of ideology in (de)radicalization processes and 
political violence. Similarly, seven mechanisms of de-radicalization were 
identified; Contact Mechanism, New Life-Meaning Mechanism, New Treatment 
Mechanism, Love Mechanism, Non-Violent Mean Mechanism, Conflict 
Regulator Mechanism, and Higher Normality of Violence Mechanism. 
It is strategical to mention that participants adopted ideologies, which 
fulfilled their need to justify their radicalization and their decision to adopt and 
join violence. Ideology is the tool, which activates the meaning-making process 
guiding the participants in their choice for justifying their seeking to their very 
fundamental human needs including identity, community and a sense of 
purpose.196 Therefore, this paper conclude that Ideology should not be 
considered as a main mechanism of (de)radicalization. 
The results of this case study also showcase that, besides the non-
controversial mechanisms and root causes of radicalization, extremism and 
terrorism, the I did not know – I did not trust mechanism, i.e. the lack of 
familiarity and/or trust in “nonviolent” means, is a fundamental mechanism for 
radicalization processes. Similarly, familiarity and trust in “non-violent” means 
are fundamental mechanisms of (de)radicalization. 
Furthermore, the political context provided opportunities for the 
normalization of violent or nonviolent behavior and attitudes. The personal, the 
group, and the mass levels of the participants were interdependent and their 
connections were multi-layered. Based on the results of this study, we conclude 
that any preventive or interceptive program, which aim at de-radicalization or 
are part of PVE or CVE programs, must, and for most, focus of creating a 
Higher Normality of Violence; i.e. to categorize more actions as violent and to 
reduce the rewards of violent actions. Working on the Normality of Violence 
would for sure be more effective than working on ideology or counter 
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narratives. Creating a Higher Normality of Violence means sustainable 
improvement of society’s resilience to political violence, radicalization, 
extremism and terrorism, leading to de-radicalization and allowing to take 
preventive measures toward a real understanding and reduction of the root 
causes of structural and cultural violence. It is essential to further advance 
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